Yesterday the People’s Bank of China said in its third-quarter monetary policy implementation report:
While creating neutral and appropriate monetary and financial environments for structural reforms and keeping liquidity reasonably ample, we should pay attention to curbing asset bubbles and preventing economic and financial risk.
The balance between stabilizing growth and preventing bubbles has become more challenging.
On the same day, the Dalian Commodities Exchange tightened restrictions of futures trading for coking coal. The reason is simple enough, there’s a bubble in Chinese commodity futures and at its core is a crazy coking coal market drunk on the Chinese policy error of limiting coal output.
Don’t get me wrong. The result has been a shortage of coking coal, with mine output down, inventories at record lows and steel output good. But, what is happening is that that kernel of truth has inflated coking coal futures volumes 500% in a month and pushed prices far above those needed to trigger the required supply response. Moreover, that bubble has spread into steel, iron ore, base metals and this week began to impact softs as well. All are setting records for the number of positive price days as hoarding returns as a favourite Chinese speculative pastime.
So, today, I will run through all of the implications of this as I see them.
Chinese policy
My working model for Chinese policy is this:
- good ideas come from the top;
- as they dribble down the bureaucratic value chain they are debased by the less competent and corrupt which figure out how to game them;
- thus when implementation comes the policies nearly always overshoot;
- when this becomes obvious, more good ideas come the top to counter the distortions arising from the first wave;
- these are again debauched in implementation and are usually ineffective;
- more Draconian measures to counter the distortions of the first two waves of good ideas come from the top, and
- reversal of the original good ideas nearly always overshoots.
We are currently in phase 5 of this process when it comes to the supply-side reform of coal and the attached bubble with the original good idea done poorly, then gamed like crazy, then partly reversed, gamed again, now partly reversed a second time. Whether we’ll see a more Draconian reversal is hard to say but, in the end, it will not matter. Supply will do it anyway.
That gives us two scenarios to work with: a quick policy reversal that crashes the bubble or a supply response that lets the air out more slowly. There is one reason to think that a more concerted effort will arrive to stamp out the bubble. Producer inflation is going to rip and drag up the CPI as well if past relationships hold:
Whether the hard brake is pulled probably depends upon whether or not food prices take off as well.
My view is that China will not want to stomp on this too hard. It is clearly prioritising growth and it will not raise interest rates given it wants a lower yuan and to destock oversupplied housing markets. That leaves the PBOC using prudential tools to lean against local bubbles like eastern cities property. This will probably work over time.
Thus the slower deflation is the higher probability outcome.
Beneficiaries
The three main beneficiaries are:
- thermal coal is an abundant and flexible market and China has already rebuilt half of its inventories so the price is going to peak this quarter (maybe already). I see it at half current levels within a year;
- coking coal is less flexible but as Alan points out the supply response is underway. The spot price is probably somewhere near its peak today given the restock is also roughly halfway done but will remain higher for longer because mines need to be re-opened and that takes time. I still see it at half current prices within a year as well;
- iron ore is also a flexible and abundant market so its peak must be very close too. It’s restock only has 5mt to run before ports have the most dirt in history. Next year it’ll see another new 50mt of super-cheap ore. I see it down a third within a year.
Thus Australia’s terms of trade will look like this over 2017:
That means higher nominal GDP, higher national income, better budget receipts and improved miner share prices. I do not expect much of an impact on wages because much of the tax revenue will be saved and there will be minimal investment flow through from the price jumps. The major beneficiaries will be the budget and mining shareholders.
In fact, the net impacts for the wider Australian economy are probably negative. With the slow deflation route of the ferrous bubble most likely, the Australian dollar may break higher for a brief period, towards or above 80 cents. It is already bid strongly today in the mid-77 cent range:
Which makes sense given the relationship between the terms of trade and trade-weighted index:
But, it also means Australian “rebalancing” to non-mining exports is taking a serious hit. It stopped growing two years ago and will soon start to shrink: