TS Lombard with the note. I agree with this. But the risks rise as the Chinese economy goes ex-growth and CCP legitimacy slides:
Foreign Affairs recently published an article arguing that a military campaign to take the island is no longer viewed by Chinese leaders “as a fantasy” but rather a “real possibility”. Military experts warn that China is capable of annexing the island–without giving the US sufficient time to come to Taiwan’s rescue. The magazine’s article argues that the Chinese public would be more accepting of a protracted cross-strait conflict than would the war-weary US. This view was echoed by senior US military commanders, who also cautioned that China could launch an invasion within the next six years, while others in Washington have said that taking control of Taiwan is an important goal for Xi to secure his legacy.
But such arguments ignore the fact that Xi has not singled out unification as an urgent priority. Furthermore, they misinterpret the real driver for his harsher rhetoric on Taiwan and rising Chinese military posturing: rather than being a precursor to conflict, these moves are designed to stop Taipei from seeking formal independence and to push back against what Beijing sees as theUS attempts to recalibrate the”One China Policy”. More broadly, they also serve as a propaganda tool for the domestic audience to showcase Chinese military strength in the face of what state media depict as a waning Washington and an enfeebled Taipei.
Those highlighting the risk of conflict argue that as China becomes more self-reliant and transitions from an export-to consumption-led economy, Beijing will be more willing to accept the cost of annexing the island. But as it stands, China is not immune to the heavy cost of sanctions, on top of the major difficulties of a military operation and subsequent occupation of a country of 23.5 million people. It is still heavily reliant on trading partners such as the US, Japan, and the European Union, which would inevitably respond to an invasion of Taiwan with a harsh raft of sanctions and other penalties.
Furthermore, analysts who argue that annexing Taiwan would hand China the keys to valuable semiconductor know-how(notably through TSMC’s cutting-edge fabs) to help realize its goals of indigenizing technological supply chains ignore the role of US, European and Japanese companies in the upstream chip supply chain. By invading Taiwan, China would be blocked from accessing critical inputs, such as Japanese chemicals and complex machinery needed for chip production as well as US and European design software.
While, as TS Lombard has argued, the invasion risk is overstated, the fragile status quo that has ensured peace across the Taiwan Strait is nevertheless in flux. Beijing and Washington each think the other is breaking the normalization agreement struck before the US transferred diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979. The PRC sees US actions to increase unofficial diplomatic ties with Taiwan (sending high-level officials to Taipei in military planes and opening trade talks) as a violation of the “One China Policy”.Meanwhile, Washington believes thatthe regular incursions by the People’s Liberation Army into Taiwan’s air defence identificationzone violates the implicit understanding in the normalization agreement that China will not useforce.
Japan is aligning itself more closely with the US against China and thereby making its unofficial support for Taiwan more explicit. Its annual defence white paper released last month included a section on Taiwan for the first time, arguing that “stabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan is important for Japan’s security and the stability of the international community”. This came after Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso had said Japan would join forces with the US todefend Taiwan from an invasion. Though the comments were unscripted and Aso is gaffe-prone,his remarks point to a shift in Tokyo, which increasingly views the defence of the island as fundamental to protecting Japan’s national security. Behind the scenes, Japan has been coordinating military planning with the USto protect against Chinese moves towards Taiwan andthe Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
China has hit back at moves by the US and Japan to strengthen support for Taiwan. However, despite disagreements between the regional players, important red lines that ensure stability remain in place. Crucially, Washington has held firm to its position of”strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan, which is an important element in ensuring peace in the region. Under this principle, the US does not explicitly say whether it would come to the island’s defence in the event of a conflict–a position designed to discourage Taiwan from seeking formal independence with the assurance of US protection. President Tsai’s refusal to bow to pressure from deeper-green elements of the Democratic People’s Party to seek formal independence is another crucial factor ensuring peace across the Taiwan Strait. So long as these two red lines remain intact, Beijing will continue to stress test Taiwan’s defensive capabilities while stopping far short of launching an invasion.
