The Australian Population Research Institute (APRI) has released a new research report questioning “Why do we have a ‘Big Australia’?”. Below is the Executive Summary:
In part, this report was prompted by a case study of Australia’s 2011 Sustainable Population Strategy. After an impressive process and attractive product, the notable effect was an incumbent government reendorsing the previous government’s big boost to migration.
Hence a question, are there underlying social or economic factors, which tend to perpetuate a cross-party ‘Big Australia’? The answer must be ‘yes’. This report arranges the reasons for this response under six banners. In short, these are Australian exceptionalism, population strategy, Treasury-GDP dominance, the growth lobby, states’ compliance, and economic biases. The main banner is that the Treasury pursuit of GDP growth dominates our population policies and projections.
Australian exceptionalism
Australia’s population growth rate is much higher than world or OECD norms. Overseas and in Australia environmental policies focus on climate change and not population growth. Nevertheless, globally, it appears that more nations have policies to lower rather than to raise population growth. Conversely, Australia and certain other developed nations are going for raised growth. But the Australian discourse glosses over our exceptional policy shift. Our 21st century population spurt is defended as inevitable or normal. Among the rich nations, however, prosperity and living standards are not predicated on high population growth.
Population strategy
The Bring-out-a-Briton ‘Populate or Perish’ policy was a feature of the postwar reconstruction. Immigration levels receded over the 1970s-1990s, while the neo-liberal economic agenda advanced. Both main parties supported the migration push of the early 2000s. This came to be justified via labour shortages of the mining boom. Following the government’s lead, Treasury and the Prime Minister’s Department steered the 2011 Population Strategy away from our high population growth. This evasion has outlived the mining boom, and continues to the present day. Immigration remains high and, until recently, seldom questioned or discussed. Our 21st century population settings, deemed critical to ‘GDP growth’, are removed from the political contest.
Treasury-GDP dominance
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measure is relatively recent. It began its irresistible rise in the 1940s. Despite economists’ reservations, and revision efforts, the usual GDP formulation governs Australian and other budgets. In a default sense only, our population policy resides in the Treasury and is dedicated to supporting growth in aggregate GDP. Though our 27-year ‘Economic Miracle’ of uninterrupted growth in GDP continues, this growth is now flatter, and the underlying contribution of population growth is vital to it. Large claims are made for demographic and economic ‘rejuvenation’ through Big Australia. The crucial migration and population plans, however, only appear as ‘technical’ parameters at the back of the budget. Our national, state, and city plans, simply assume high population growth for decades ahead.
The growth lobby
Over 1972-2006, our population grew, by an average of 210,000 a year. But that average has topped 375,000, over the years since. Across the political spectrum, a diverse coalition backs this GDP-driven population push. Political parties, Treasury, the Reserve Bank, States, and industry, are prominent. ‘Progressive’ or ‘green’ voices tend to align with this dominant group. Countervailing scientific concerns around our carrying capacity and State of the Environment are at a discount. Today the electorate is shying from the dominant program of demographic growth. But their legitimate concerns tend to be sidelined or patronised by the pro-growth coalition.
States’ compliance
The federal budget gets the main GDP boost from population growth. States and cities, while also upping their GSPs (gross state products), pick up the tab for infrastructure and services. The states are enthusiastic about population growth but their citizens could be forgiven for thinking that the tab is short paid. Too often, training, education, or transport, planners are ‘caught short’ by rapid growth. In congested cities that have suffered world-ranking housing unaffordability, many solutions are on the table – after Big Australia has been taken off the table. City plans for mid-century begin by nearly doubling the population, and then assuming that other variables will fit in. Some talk of channelling growth away from the cities and into the regions but ‘decentralisation’ has never been a meaningful solution for Australia’s population growth.
Economic biases
Under the lower migration of the 1970s-1990s, GDP growth was usually positive. Since the 1980s, inequality has climbed. Many voters and some economists worry that Big Australia itself works against wages, income or wealth equality, and housing affordability. Which is to say, the gains to the few look more assured than the gains for the many. Benefits to the older, look more assured than benefits to the younger, or to future generations. Working from international comparisons, it looks as though mass migration may not be the go-to program to update our economy away from its focus on ‘resources-and-services’ and towards an innovation economy. Nor do federal and state governments underwrite honest infrastructure plans to cover the high population growth.
In conclusion, the economic and fiscal growth machines dominate our population policy and its population ‘projections’. We’ve climbed well above the OECD population growth averages. If Big Australia does little for equality of opportunity or future economic pathways, while the environment and services struggle and electors wilt, we ought to revisit the lower population trajectories that applied without harm and not so long ago. Given the cultural and historical roots of Big Australia, that may not be easy. Reform would more likely come from political ‘circuit breakers’ than from the bureaucracy. That is what happened in New Zealand. One party broke ranks, promising to realign population growth with infrastructure capacities.
In Australia, vigorous border control policy covers for vigorous migration policy. The Department of Home Affairs pursues both avenues at once. ‘Stop the boats’ and detention programs distract from the Big Australia policy. The migration shortfalls since 2016-17 have been attributed to stricter security checks against bigger and more connected databases.
The official 2017-18 intake of permanent migrants, 163,000, is still very high – just 10-15 per cent off six years of record highs. The latest annual net overseas migration (NOM) figures stand well over 200,000. Short to medium term, there may not be any deep reflection on our population policy. Nevertheless, it’s just possible the disconnection between our population growth and our carrying (and servicing) capacity will eventually produce a real policy shift.
In that, our migration intake would turn back towards the 70,000-90,000 levels of 1992-2002. Also, we might place the population tab under a ceiling of 1 per cent growth a year, budget for longer-term migration implications along with short-term GDP boosts, reconsider the environmental constraints with a view to something more like a 30m population at 2050, and establish a proper population agency with its own minister. A grace note would be to shift our Migration and Humanitarian plans away from any ‘border protection’ boasts.
