The military situation in Iraq

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Markets seem quite happy to ignore Iraq. For an insight into why let’s turn to Kenneth M. Pollack of the Brookings Institution who argues that as awful as the situation is, it is unlikely to degenerate into a broader civil war.

CaveatIt is exceptionally difficult to understand the dynamics of ongoing military operations. Oftentimes, the participants themselves do not know why they are winning or losing, or even where they are in control or where their troops are. For non-participants, it is often equally difficult to gain more than a rudimentary sense of the combat without access to the sophisticated intelligence gathering capabilities—overhead imagery, signals intercepts, human reporting, etc.—available to the United States and some other governments. As one of the CIA’s Persian Gulf military analysts during the 1990-91 Gulf War, I noted the difficulty that many outside analysts had in gauging the capabilities of the two sides and following the course of operations because they did not have access to the information available to us from U.S. government assets. Consequently, readers should bring a healthy dose of skepticism to all such analyses of the current fighting in Iraq, including this one.

What appears to be the most likely scenario at this point is that the rapid Sunni militant advance is likely to be stalemated at or north of Baghdad. They will probably continue to make some advances, but it seems unlikely that they will be able to overrun Baghdad and may not even make it to the capital. This scenario appears considerably more likely than the two next most likely alternative scenarios: that the Sunni militants overrun Baghdad and continue their advance south into the Shia heartland of Iraq; or that the Shia coalition is able to counterattack and drive the Sunnis out of most of their recent conquests.

It is not a coincidence that the Sunni militants made rapid advances across primarily Sunni lands. That’s because it is not surprising that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) would crumble in those areas. As Baghdad has (rightly) observed, several of the divisions in the north were disproportionately composed of Kurds and Sunni Arabs, many of them frustrated and alienated by Prime Minister Maliki’s harsh consolidation of power and marginalization of their communities. They were never going to fight to the death for Maliki and against Sunni militants looking to stop him. Similarly, the considerable number of Shia troops in the north understandably saw little point to fighting and dying for principally Sunni cities like Mosul, Tikrit, Bayji, etc.

Baghdad could be another matter entirely. First, it is a vast city of almost 9 million people compared to Mosul with less than 2 million. Moreover, the Sunni militants only secured the western (Sunni Arab) half of Mosul, leaving the eastern (Kurdish-dominated) half alone. Conquering a city the size of Baghdad is always a formidable undertaking when it is defended by determined troops.

After the battles of the 2006-2008 civil war, Baghdad is also now a more heavily Shia city—probably 75-80 percent of its population, although it is very difficult to know for certain. While it is understandable, even predictable, that Shia troops would not fight and die for Sunni cities, many are likely to find their courage when they are defending their homes and families in Baghdad and the other Shia-dominated cities of the south.

In addition, as has been well-reported, the (largely-Shia) remnants of the ISF are being reinforced by Shia militiamen and bolstered by contingents of Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Although many of the Shia militiamen will be new recruits answering Ayatollah Sistani’s call to defend their community, others are hardened veterans of the fighting in Iraq in 2006-2008 and Syria since 2011.

Thus, the Sunni militants are likely to come up against a far more determined and numerous foe than they have confronted so far. The most likely outcome of that fighting will be a vicious stalemate at or north of Baghdad, basically along Iraq’s ethno-sectarian divide. That is also not surprising because it conforms to the pattern of many similar intercommunal civil wars. In Syria today, in Lebanon in the 1980s, Afghanistan in the 1990s, and elsewhere, that is where the frontlines tend to stalemate. They can shift here and there in small ways, but generally remain unchanged for years. That’s because militias in civil wars find it far easier to hold territory inhabited by the members of their identity group than to conquer (and hold) territory inhabited by members of a rival identity group. It’s one reason they typically try to “cleanse” any territory they have conquered of members of the rival identity group.

If military developments in Iraq conform to this most likely scenario, they could lead to a protracted, bloody stalemate along those lines. In that case, one side or the other would have to receive disproportionately greater military assistance from an outside backer than its adversary to make meaningful territorial gains. Absent that, the fighting will probably continue for years and hundreds of thousands will die.

Watch Anbar. So far, the Sunni militants in Anbar are the dog that hasn’t barked, at least not yet. Obviously, the Sunni militants have significant strength in Anbar, including considerable numbers of ISIS fighters. It is militarily obvious that they should seek to develop a complimentary offensive out of Anbar. Doing so would allow them to (1) open another axis of advance against Baghdad and catch it in a classic pincer movement, or (2) develop a direct advance against the great Shia religious cities of Karbala and Najaf (the most sacred sites in Shia Islam), and/or (3) force the Shia to divert military assets away from the north-south Sunni advance and potentially overstretch their manpower and command and control.

Consequently, the fact that no such offensive has yet materialized is noteworthy. It may be that Sunni militant forces in Anbar were so badly beaten up in the fighting with the ISF around Fallujah and Ramadi that they are not capable of mounting such an attack. Alternatively, they may be preparing to do precisely that.

In short, Anbar bears watching because a Sunni offensive there will further stress the Shia defenses. It is a key variable that could undermine the Shia defense of Baghdad. So if you are looking for something that would push Iraq from the most likely scenario (a bloody stalemate in or north of Baghdad) to the second most likely scenario (a continued Sunni advance through and beyond Baghdad) a successful Sunni offensive from Anbar would be one such variable.

Watch Iran. Given the various problems on the Shia side (demoralization, fragmentation, politicization of the ISF), the variable that would be most likely to advantage the Shia and push Iraq from the most likely scenario (a bloody stalemate in or north of Baghdad) to the third most likely scenario (a Shia counteroffensive that eliminates most of the Sunni gains) is Iranian participation. On their own, it is unlikely that even the larger and more motivated Iraqi Shia forces now assembling to defend Baghdad would be able to retake the Sunni-dominated north. What would make that far more possible would be much greater Iranian involvement, particularly much larger commitments of Iranian ground combat formations.

So far, Iran appears only to have committed three battalion-sized groups of Quds force personnel. Quds force personnel are typically trainers and advisers, not line infantrymen. They are the “Green Berets” of Iran, who help make indigenous forces better rather than fighting the fight themselves. That would make sense for the current situation in Iraq, and those personnel will help stiffen the Shia defense of Baghdad. However, they are unlikely to improve Shia capabilities to the point where they can develop a major offensive to take back the North. Only the commitment of large numbers of Iranian line formations—infantry, armor and artillery—could do that. Consequently, were we to see a large Iranian commitment of such ground combat units, it would signal that the third-most likely scenario was becoming far more likely.

Much more here

Comments

  1. “..As one of the CIA’s Persian Gulf military analysts during the 1990-91 Gulf War….”

    An interesting article that reminds just how long the US have been, well interested, in Iraq.

    Funny, I don’t recall any US suggestions for the adoption of political structures (federalism, separate states etc) in Iraq that might be effective in reflecting and accommodating the sectarian divisions and the character of the regions.

    Or even better have the people contribute to answering the question.

    “What political structure for your area and Iraq as a whole do you think is most likely to be acceptable to most people who live in Iraq”

    The kurds in the north were pretty clear what they thought would work – an autonomous north.

    But then I suppose the wishes of the Iraqi people have never really been the priority. It has been all about who gets the keys to the monopoly on power.

    Until that is addressed, hoping that whoever is running Baghdad, Maliki or someone else will ‘play nice’ with power is just wishful thinking.

    • “Powers once granted are almost impossible to take back.”

      “After 13.5 years, there is more than enough evidence for reasonable people to conclude that the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama are easily the most destructive in U.S. history.( CH Smith)
      http://www.oftwominds.com/blog.html

    • GunnamattaMEMBER

      It isnt just the punters in Iraq, there are a load of Kurds in Iran and Turkey who wouldnt mind a bit of autonomy, but an awful lot of punters in Ankara and Teheran who would view any sort of implied recognition of such with a generally hostile stance.

      The ghosts of Mr Sykes and Mr Picot would be having a chuckle that their descendants have no greater ability to reflect a reality on the ground (or even to pose the question of what that may be) without becoming involved in something so complex as to be carcinogenic to foreign policies all round (pick a country and try and nut out the relevant minority), and the only thing anyone from outside the region wants is the oil.

      • migtronixMEMBER

        Oil you say?

        For years, American administrations have embraced U.N. peacekeeping as a cost-effective alternative to U.S. military intervention, a policy that has allowed Washington to harness the power and purse of foreign governments to promote America’s security and humanitarian interests abroad. “It’s a smart investment,” President Obama recently told cadets at West Point.

        In South Sudan, the investment is indeed paying dividends — for China. Last month, Beijing quietly secured a deal that will put the U.N.’s famed blue helmets to work protecting workers in South Sudan’s oil installations, where China has invested billions of dollars over the years and holds a major financial stake — at least 40 percent — in South Sudan’s largest oil field. American taxpayers, who fund about 27 percent of the cost of U.N. peacekeeping missions, will effectively be helping to shoulder the financial burden of securing China’s investment.

        Well well look who’s at the BIG BOY table and can call on UN proxies. At 20 I realised something about international “relations”/power politics wasn’t all that it seemed, in my mid 30s I’m forced to acknowledge no one knows what the f#ck they’re doing – but it doesn’t stop them trying! Klunk klunk klunk…

        http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/06/15/un_peacekeepers_to_protect_chinas_oil_interests_in_south_sudan

    • migtronixMEMBER

      If by interested you mean using Iraq to destabilise the entire region, it’s been going on since the fifties…

      • Yes, and that was only when the USA and the USSR took over responsibility from the UK and France for shafting oil bearing regions.

  2. “unlikely to degenerate into a broader civil war”

    Really

    Standby Standby!

    The US will use this to push another war as they up the anti. Incredible that they talk of working with Iran so shortly after demonizing them.

    In truth it’s a win win for the Zionist agenda when they have Arabs killing more Arabs.

    • Ronin8317MEMBER

      US cannot afford another war in the Middle East, so it’s easier to stir things up and let the various factions kill each another. Obama’s foreign policy speech earlier in the year signal that US’s foreign policy will return to playing ‘balance of power’ (a.k.a. Realpolitik) rather than ‘mission from God’. The next target for ISIL will probably be Jordan.

  3. The US is the Worlds biggest terrorist. Over the past 60 yrs they have invaded & destroyed wherever they go.

    The US is a cowardly nation that employs torture, judicial killings, assassinations & the installation & support of despot rulers. They will never put boots on the ground anywhere they might get real opposition.

    The UK & unfortunately Australia are the lackeys that can’t say NO MORE ! Look no further than the recent forelock tugging in Washington from the despicable idiot who is our Prime Minister.

    It’s all quite sickening !