Should Australians go on an energy bill strike?

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Residents of the UK are doing so:

Like millions of people across Britain, Josina, a teacher from Sheffield, is being pushed into poverty by rising energy prices. This October, when bills are set to rise again, she will have to cut back on food and other essentials if she has any hope of keeping up with the payments.

“It’s terrifying, especially with three teenagers in the house. They aren’t old enough to be out working yet. They’re relying on us, and it’s a really scary thought that you potentially can’t provide for your children in that way,” she said.

So Josina, 35, has made a decision: she is not going to pay her energy bill. She is one of thousands of activists joining a civil disobedience movement protesting at the soaring cost of energy.

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From 1 October, the energy price cap – the maximum amount suppliers can charge in England, Scotland and Wales – will go up, leading to further bill rises for millions of customers. The typical gas and electricity bill is expected to reach £3,358 in October, according to consultancy Cornwall Insight. In October 2021, the average annual bill was £1,400.

Protesters are expected to take to the streets. But as well as more traditional campaigning methods, they also plan to pile pressure on energy suppliers and the government by ignoring their bills and cancelling their direct debits.

Arguably, Australians should be considering this form of civil disobedience much more so than Britons. The UK has little in the way of energy resources. It is also much closer to, and much more involved in, the war in Ukraine. So sky-high market prices for gas and electricity at least make sense there, even if they should, (and are) be brought down via mechanisms like super profits taxes.

Distant Australia has a huge abundance of energy resources and has nothing whatsoever to do with Ukraine. Yet, local households will face the same scale of price hikes over the next year if the local gas and coal export cartels are not reined in.

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Moreover, the reason the prices have been imported into Australia is already criminal. As the ACCC so beautifully described, the gas cartel is breaking the law in broad daylight:

• The upstream market is highly concentrated and dominated by the three LNG exporters and their associates. In 2021, the three LNG exporters and their associates had influence over close to 90% of the 2P reserves in the east coast, through a combination of their direct interests in 2P reserves, associates, JVs and exclusivity arrangements. This highlights the effective control that the LNG exporters have over the supply and development of gas in the east coast, as well as competition in the domestic market.

• JVs can adversely affect competition if participants do not put in place and adhere to robust ring-fencing arrangements that prevent the sharing of commercially sensitive information, 8 with other projects in which JV participants have an interest. A JV participant can also have the incentive and opportunity to exploit their position in a JV to delay the development of gas if it improves the participant’s competitive position in other projects.

• Joint marketing by incorporated and unincorporated JVs is more prevalent than we expected, with the LNG exporters and some other producers engaging in joint marketing in the domestic market without authorisation. This results in a material reduction in the number of producers competing to supply gas into the domestic market.9

• Exclusivity provisions in GSAs entered into between domestic producers (as sellers) and LNG exporters (as buyers) are restricting the ability of domestic producers to compete to supply gas into the domestic market. These provisions can also reduce the incentive that domestic producers have to develop gas over time and result in development decisions being based on the requirements of the LNG exporters, rather than the domestic market.

• Mergers and acquisitions of other producers, tenements or interests in JVs by larger producers, can result in a reduction in producers competing to supply gas into the market and slow the progress of gas development.

Together with the high degree of concentration in this part of the market, these arrangements contribute to a lack of effective upstream competition in the east coast. They may also increase the risk of coordinated conduct and increase the market power of the LNG exporters. This is concerning, given the supply conditions that are expected to prevail in the east coast in 2023 and beyond, and the reliance that will be placed on the LNG exporters to supply more gas into the domestic market.

Entering into these types of arrangements without authorisation risks breaking the restrictive trade practices provisions in Part IV of the CCA if they amount to cartel conduct, or have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.

While in the past producers may have considered that these arrangements would not substantially lessen competition, in a concentrated and tight market the effect on competition can be heightened. We will continue to review some of these arrangements and, where appropriate, consider enforcement action.

Producers should also consider whether they could implement changes to their arrangements to help improve competition and the timely supply of gas to the market as a matter of priority.

If Albo’s cowards refuse to crack down on this criminal conspiracy then why wouldn’t Australian households turn to civil disobedience and an energy bill strike?

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About the author
David Llewellyn-Smith is Chief Strategist at the MB Fund and MB Super. David is the founding publisher and editor of MacroBusiness and was the founding publisher and global economy editor of The Diplomat, the Asia Pacific’s leading geo-politics and economics portal. He is also a former gold trader and economic commentator at The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, the ABC and Business Spectator. He is the co-author of The Great Crash of 2008 with Ross Garnaut and was the editor of the second Garnaut Climate Change Review.