Inspired by a dramatic losing election hand, Chickenhawk Peter Dutton is launching press releases faster than a metal storm barrage.
Earlier this week we heard that Australia will be acquiring new long-range missiles for boats and planes. These are, predictably, completely useless. Greg Sheridan:
Defence Minister Peter Dutton said the new missiles announced on Tuesday were necessary to keep the Chinese threat at bay, and to stand up to any acts of aggression against us.
Sadly, the missile announcements don’t add up to very much at all.
…We have a tick under 70 fast jets that could fire long-range missiles, maybe two each, one under each wing, though that would limit the planes’ range. That’s 140 missiles tops for the air force.
There are eight Anzac frigates, which have a pathetic eight vertical launch system missile cells each. The Anzac frigates were never designed to fight modern Chinese war ships, which have 100 VSL cells each.
All their VSLs would be used in self-defence to shoot down missiles. They do not have the capacity for self-defence plus delivering a blow to someone else.
The Anzac VSLs do not fire anti-ship missiles. The Anzacs carry eight anti-ship missiles on their decks. That’s 64.
The AWDs also have eight anti-ship missiles, so that’s another 24, giving 228 missiles maximum for our entire defence force.
Militarily, you can generally deploy one-third of what you’ve theoretically got, that’s about 75 missiles at any one time.
In short, with Chickhawk Dutton’s newest capability, the entire ADF will be overwhelmed by one Chinese warship.
Never fear, the Chickenhawk has more good news:
Today, the leaders of the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) partnership – Prime Minister Scott Morrison of Australia, Prime Minister Boris Johnson of the United Kingdom, and President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. of the United States – assessed progress under AUKUS.
We reaffirmed our commitment to AUKUS and to a free and open Indo-Pacific. In light of Russia’s unprovoked, unjustified, and unlawful invasion of Ukraine, we reiterated our unwavering commitment to an international system that respects human rights, the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes free from coercion.
We are pleased with the progress in our trilateral program for Australia to establish a conventionally armed, nuclear‑powered submarine capability. We are fully committed to establishing a robust approach to sharing naval propulsion technology with Australia that strengthens the global non-proliferation regime.
We also committed today to commence new trilateral cooperation on hypersonics and counter-hypersonics, and electronic warfare capabilities, as well as to expand information sharing and to deepen cooperation on defense innovation. These initiatives will add to our existing efforts to deepen cooperation on cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities. As our work progresses on these and other critical defense and security capabilities, we will seek opportunities to engage allies and close partners.
So, nuclear subs in 2050, long after we’re already Chinese in all but name, thanks to being ringed, bombed and strafed from a bribed and militarised Pacific archipelago turned CCP naval blockade. And now…wait for it…hypersonic missiles on an unknown timeframe, cost, and capability are to join the fictitious and outflanked submarines.
The US has tested such weapons but they remain under a cloud, according to the most recent report to Congress:
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.
Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, to the advances in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a number of hypersonic weapons programs and have likely fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles—potentially armed with nuclear warheads. Most U.S. hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.
The Pentagon’s FY2022 budget request for hypersonic research is $3.8 billion—up from $3.2 billion in the FY2021 request. The Missile Defense Agency additionally requested $247.9 million for hypersonic defense. At present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not have approved either mission requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans. Indeed, as Principal Director for Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets.
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions about the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and arms control. Potential questions include the following:
- What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint operational doctrine and concepts?
- Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an acceleration of research on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile defense options both necessary and technologically feasible?
- How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?
- Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities?
Here’s an idea. Instead of watching Battlestar Galactica again, how about Chickenhawk Dutton does something – anything – to destabilise the Solomon Island’s China deal so that Australia can survive long enough to take delivery of his Wunderwaffe toys.
