Fed minutes below. On normalsation:
Some committee members had been asked by members of the public whether, if tapering in the pace of purchases continues as expected, the final reduction would come in a single $15 billion per month reduction or in a $10 billion reduction followed by a $5 billion reduction. Most participants viewed this as a technical issue with no substantive macroeconomic consequences and no consequences for the eventual decision about the timing of the first increase in the federal funds rate–a decision that will depend on the Committee’s evolving assessments of actual and expected progress toward its objectives. In light of these considerations, participants generally agreed that if incoming information continued to support its expectation of improvement in labor market conditions and a return of inflation toward its longer-run objective, it would be appropriate to complete asset purchases with a $15 billion reduction in the pace of purchases in order to avoid having the small, remaining level of purchases receive undue focus among investors. If the economy progresses about as the Committee expects, warranting reductions in the pace of purchases at each upcoming meeting, this final reduction would occur following the October meeting.
Meeting participants continued their discussion of issues associated with the eventual normalization of the stance and conduct of monetary policy. The Committee’s consideration of this topic was undertaken as part of prudent planning and did not imply that normalization would necessarily begin sometime soon. A staff presentation included some possible strategies for implementing and communicating monetary policy during a period when the Federal Reserve will have a very large balance sheet. In addition, the presentation outlined design features of a potential ON RRP facility and discussed options for the Committee’s policy of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction and reinvesting principal payments on all agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in agency MBS.
Most participants agreed that adjustments in the rate of interest on excess reserves (IOER) should play a central role during the normalization process. It was generally agreed that an ON RRP facility with an interest rate set below the IOER rate could play a useful supporting role by helping to firm the floor under money market interest rates. One participant thought that the ON RRP rate would be the more effective policy tool during normalization in light of the wider variety of counterparties eligible to participate in ON RRP operations. The appropriate size of the spread between the IOER and ON RRP rates was discussed, with many participants judging that a relatively wide spread–perhaps near or above the current level of 20 basis points–would support trading in the federal funds market and provide adequate control over market interest rates. Several participants noted that the spread might be adjusted during the normalization process. A couple of participants suggested that adequate control of short-term rates might be accomplished with a very wide spread or even without an ON RRP facility. A few participants commented that the Committee should also be prepared to use its other policy tools, including term deposits and term reverse repurchase agreements, if necessary. Most participants thought that the federal funds rate should continue to play a role in the Committee’s operating framework and communications during normalization, with many of them indicating a preference for continuing to announce a target range. However, a few participants thought that, given the degree of uncertainty about the effects of the Committee’s tools on market rates, it might be preferable to focus on an administered rate in communicating the stance of policy during the normalization period. In addition, participants examined possibilities for changing the calculation of the effective federal funds rate in order to obtain a more robust measure of overnight bank funding rates and to apply lessons from international efforts to develop improved standards for benchmark interest rates.
While generally agreeing that an ON RRP facility could play an important role in the policy normalization process, participants discussed several potential unintended consequences of using such a facility and design features that could help to mitigate these consequences. Most participants expressed concerns that in times of financial stress, the facility’s counterparties could shift investments toward the facility and away from financial and nonfinancial corporations, possibly causing disruptions in funding that could magnify the stress. In addition, a number of participants noted that a relatively large ON RRP facility had the potential to expand the Federal Reserve’s role in financial intermediation and reshape the financial industry in ways that were difficult to anticipate. Participants discussed design features that could address these concerns, including constraints on usage either in the aggregate or by counterparty and a relatively wide spread between the ON RRP rate and the IOER rate that would help limit the facility’s size. Several participants emphasized that, although the ON RRP rate would be useful in controlling short-term interest rates during normalization, they did not anticipate that such a facility would be a permanent part of the Committee’s longer-run operating framework. Finally, a number of participants expressed concern about conducting monetary policy operations with nontraditional counterparties.
Participants also discussed the appropriate time for making a change to the Committee’s policy of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction and reinvesting principal payments on all agency debt and agency MBS in agency MBS. It was noted that, in the staff’s models, making a change to the Committee’s reinvestment policy prior to the liftoff of the federal funds rate, at the time of liftoff, or sometime thereafter would be expected to have only limited implications for macroeconomic outcomes, the Committee’s statutory objectives, or remittances to the Treasury. Many participants agreed that ending reinvestments at or after the time of liftoff would be best, with most of these participants preferring to end them after liftoff. These participants thought that an earlier change to the reinvestment policy would involve risks to the economic outlook if it was seen as suggesting that the Committee was likely to tighten policy more rapidly than currently anticipated or if it had unexpectedly large effects in MBS markets; moreover, an early change could add complexity to the Committee’s communications at a time when it would be clearer to signal changes in policy through interest rates alone. However, some participants favored ending reinvestments prior to the first firming in policy interest rates, as stated in the Committee’s exit strategy principles announced in June 2011. Those participants thought that such an approach would avoid weakening the credibility of the Committee’s communications regarding normalization, would act to modestly reduce the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, or would help prepare the public for the eventual rise in short-term interest rates. Regardless of whether they preferred to introduce a change to the Committee’s reinvestment policy before or after the initial tightening in short-term interest rates, a number of participants thought that it might be best to follow a graduated approach with respect to winding down reinvestments or to manage reinvestments in a manner that would smooth the decline in the balance sheet. Some stressed that the details should depend on financial and economic conditions.
Overall, participants generally expressed a preference for a simple and clear approach to normalization that would facilitate communication to the public and enhance the credibility of monetary policy. It was observed that it would be useful for the Committee to develop and communicate its plans to the public later this year, well before the first steps in normalizing policy become appropriate. Most participants indicated that they expected to learn more about the effects of the Committee’s various policy tools as normalization proceeds, and many favored maintaining flexibility about the evolution of the normalization process as well as the Committee’s longer-run operating framework. Participants requested additional analysis from the staff on issues related to normalization and agreed that it would be helpful to continue to review these issues at upcoming meetings.
And inflation:
The staff’s forecast for inflation in the near term was revised up a little as recent data showed somewhat faster increases in consumer prices than anticipated. However, the medium-term projection for inflation was revised down slightly, reflecting a reassessment by the staff of the underlying trend in inflation. The staff continued to forecast that inflation would remain below the Committee’s longer-run objective of 2 percent over the next few years. With longer-run inflation expectations assumed to remain stable, changes in commodity and import prices expected to be subdued, and slack in labor and product markets anticipated to diminish slowly, inflation was projected to rise gradually toward the Committee’s objective. The staff continued to project that inflation would reach the Committee’s objective in the longer run.
Bit of are covering but not enough to upset anyone:
The VIX, an index of option-implied volatility for one-month returns on the S&P 500 index, continued to decline and ended the period near its historical lows. Measures of uncertainty in other financial markets also declined; results from the Desk’s primary dealer survey suggested this development might have reflected low realized volatilities, generally favorable economic news, less uncertainty for the path of monetary policy, and complacency on the part of market participants about potential risks.
Steady as she goes, nothing to spook markets. The Aussie jumped over 94 cents. What the RBA giveth the Fed taketh away.
